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Asymmetric Response: Explaining Corporate Social Disclosure by Multi-
National Firms in Environmentally Sensitive Industries 
 
 
Abstract— The paper examines the determinants of corporate social disclosure (CSD) 
using a sample drawn from environmentally sensitive industries. It extends the 
traditional literature in two respects. First, it is international in scope, examining the 
accounting disclosure responses of multi-national companies to the pressures implied 
by the nature and scope of their operations. Second, variables measuring political risk 
and social development are developed so that these pressures can be measured, 
thereby introducing new dimensions to the literature. In common with previous 
studies, financial risk, size and other control variables are included. The relationships 
are tested econometrically utilising regression techniques not previously applied in the 
CSD literature but nonetheless more generally appropriate when using count 
dependent variables. Our results suggest that managers feel an unequal sense of 
responsibility to different constituencies and their disclosure priorities are determined 
by stock market accountability, lobbying power of their domestic audience and the 
political risk of their activities rather than the impact of their activities in countries of 
operation. 
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1. Introduction  
Why do large multi-national firms make corporate social disclosures (CSDs) in their 
annual reports? Two possible hypotheses are explored in this paper. First, the ‘benign’ 
managerialist hypothesis that the firms are essentially enlightened oligarchies, which 
recognise their social and environmental impact and their associated responsibilities 
and make appropriate disclosures. At the centre of this argument is the notion that 
CSD arises from an ethical code which is espoused by the senior management of the 
firm and is transmitted ‘top down’ as a matter of policy. If the benign hypothesis were 
true, it would be expected that the CSD response would be proportionate to the 
international scope of the firm’s activities. 
An alternative second hypothesis is that firms have no such ethical code and 
that managers merely respond to market, social and political pressures when making 
CSDs. According to this hypothesis, CSDs reflect differential political, regulatory and 
lobbying power in different countries. Where these powers are the strongest, the firm 
makes greater CSDs in response, notwithstanding the objective level of environmental 
impact in that country. Where powers are weaker, for example in unstable and 
underdeveloped countries managers face less direct pressure to make CSDs. Actual 
disclosures may in these circumstances be aimed at the governments and public where 
the corporation is domiciled, particularly where political, regulatory and lobbying 
systems are well-developed. If this is so, then managers are motivated to make CSDs 
as an ‘asymmetric response’ to the asymmetric power and influence produced by the 
ownership of resources and differential patterns of regulation. 
Such an asymmetric response hypothesis is suggestive of two further detailed 
relationships. First, CSDs, like other accounting disclosures, are responses to the 
requirements of shareholders. As a powerful interest group, shareholders demand, and 
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managers supply, non-financial as well as financial information as part of a risk 
management process designed to mitigate political risks. Consequently, a second 
relationship is that CSDs will be made for the benefit of the domestic population 
rather than for the benefit of populations impacted by the firms’ overseas operations. 
A corollary is that CSDs inculcate a sense in domestic populations that their 
domiciled corporations are much more socially responsible than they actually are.1  
It should be noted that in setting up these hypotheses, the study differs from 
previous theoretical literature in important respects. The next section outlines these 
differences and reviews the prior empirical literature. Section three sets out the data 
and model to test the benign and asymmetric response hypotheses. Section four 
analyses the results. Section five draws conclusions and discusses the implications of 
the support for the asymmetric response hypothesis. 
 
2. Prior studies of the determinants of CSD 
The purpose of the paper is to conduct an empirical test of the null benign hypothesis 
and the alternative asymmetric response hypotheses as introduced above. There is 
currently little recent evidence in favour of either hypothesis or indeed on the 
relationship between international activity and CSD in general. In recent studies the 
firm’s country of origin (Newson and Deegan, 2002) and associated cultural 
differences contribute to differences in practice (Adams, 2002).2 Even so, of the large 
                                                 
1  This aspect of the asymmetric response hypothesis is similar to the ‘Maginot’ 
hypothesis (Glasbeek, 1988; Wolfson and Beck, 2005), where, like the French 
fortifications of 1940, CSDs create a false sense of security.  
 
2 Where the literature on voluntary disclosure includes international comparison, 
studies have focused on areas besides CSD, for example intellectual capital (Brennan, 
2001, and Bozzolan et al., 2003). For an exceptional example, see Guthrie and Parker 
(1990). 
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recent empirical literature on the determinants of CSD (for recent reviews, see 
Newson and Deegan, 2002; Brown and Fraser, 2006), the overwhelming majority is 
country specific (for example Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan et al 2002; 
O’Dwyer, 2002; Cho et al 2006). Gray et al’s (2001, p.332) suggestion that ‘it is 
increasingly clear that social and environmental disclosure varies according to 
country.… Whether, however, any putative relationship between disclosure and 
corporate characteristics could be expected to exhibit itself consistently across 
different countries has not been examined systematically’, therefore remains an 
important motivation for further research. 
Country specific studies have adopted two distinct approaches. First, there 
have been economic studies which have explained CSD in terms of national stock 
market reaction and associated accounting metrics (Aerts et al 2008). Second, CSD 
has been related to the social context in which firms operate. In these approaches, 
either the economic relationship between the firm’s management and shareholders is 
extended to include social and environmental interests as part of a wider definition of 
the firm’s stakeholders, or CSD is seen as a process of legitimating the firm’s 
activities in the eyes of society. To explain the differences between the approaches 
used in the current paper and the previous economic and social context studies, each 
aspect of the prior literature is now discussed in turn. 
 Economic studies have suggested that the stock market acts as an important 
source of demand for CSD information. Content analyses of website disclosures (Jose 
and Lee, 2007) and surveys of stock market participants have tended to conclude that 
CSDs are of moderate relative importance (Belkaoui, 1984; Benjamin and Stanga, 
1977; Chenall and Juchau, 1977; Firth, 1979; Epstein and Freedman, 1994) while 
other ranking studies undertake surveys of potential users to indicate their needs and 
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demands for social information (e.g., Buzby and Falk, 1979; Belkaoui, 1980; Dierkes 
and Antal, 1985). These studies find CSD to be of importance to users, and, in some 
cases, at least equally important as financial items of disclosure. More recently, 
Deegan and Rankin (1997) asked respondents to consider whether different decisions 
would be made depending on the availability of CSD, finding that environmental 
disclosures are important and material to investors. From an agency theory 
perspective, as shareholders become aware of the effect of social and environmental 
performance of the firms in which they invest, managers will emphasise social and 
environmental performance by disclosing social and environmental information in the 
annual reports (Ness and Mirza, 1991). Other studies (Milne and Chan, 1999, Murray 
et al, 2006) however, suggest investors largely ignore narrative social disclosure, 
whilst Toms (2002) and Hasseldine et al (2005) find that specific, auditable, and 
quantitative disclosures are more useful in building corporate social reputation. 
To compound the problems of interpreting their mixed empirical results, these 
studies are often either mis-specified, under-theorised, fail to discriminate between 
hypotheses (Gray et al., 1995a; Tilt and Symes, 1999; Milne, 2002; Al-Tuwaijri et al 
2004) or, lacking an international dimension, too limited in scope. In general, they are 
unable to accommodate structural conflicts of interest and inequalities (Tinker et al., 
1991). Specifically for the purposes of the current study, if the demand for CSD is 
expressed only as a function of stock market calculation, although stock market 
participants may reflect social and political pressures in their valuations, the influence 
of these wider pressures cannot be quantified or differentiated from the underlying 
financial value of the disclosure. As the scope of international activity expands, it is 
expected that the firm faces greater pressure to disclose from a wider range of 
international financial institutions whose expectations may be complementary. At the 
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same time, the political and social pressure for disclosure will potentially increase and 
these must be differentiated for the purposes of empirical testing. 
 Legitimacy theory offers a potential solution to the under-theorisation of the 
economics-based studies. It is founded on the notion of a social contract (Dierkes and 
Antal, 1985; Gray et al., 1995b) and the dimensions of such a contract potentially 
increase as the firm diversifies its activities internationally. Accordingly, CSD is 
sometimes seen as a response to threats to the organisation’s legitimacy (Deegan et al 
2000; Deegan, 2002). CSD may also be seen as a tool for establishing, protecting or 
repairing the legitimacy of the organisation in that they may influence public opinion 
and public policy (Patten, 1991; Cho and Patten 2007) and reduce political, social and 
economic exposure and pressure (Deegan and Rankin, 1997). Additionally, 
legitimation through CSD may play a part in influencing the policy process by 
shaping social and environmental standards, as suggested by Patten (1992: 472).  
From the description of these studies, it can be seen that legitimacy theory is 
potentially nested within the benign hypothesis, as managers seek to fulfil their side of 
the social contract. The same might be said of ethical perspective stakeholder theory, 
in which all stakeholders (both primary and secondary) have a right to be provided 
with information about how the organization is impacting on them, through pollution, 
community engagement and so on (Deegan, 2000). For Lindblom (1994) the purpose 
is to influence ‘relevant publics’. If a multi-national corporation begins to exploit the 
natural environment of an underdeveloped country, it follows that the members of that 
society become a ‘relevant public’. However, it seems equally likely that the firm will 
not seek to manage its relationship with this ‘public’ if it has underdeveloped political 
organisation, regulation and lobbying institutions. Some studies have noted the 
selective nature of corporate legitimation and find that in situations of conflicting 
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interests, organisations attempt to communicate legitimating characteristics to the 
most important relevant public and to ignore less important publics (Neu et al., 1998; 
Oliver, 1991). Acceptance of differential importance provides potential support for 
the asymmetric response hypothesis, and how ‘most important’ is defined and 
measured is very important for empirical testing.  
Some of the answer is provided by stakeholder theory. According to this 
perspective, a stakeholder’s power to influence corporate management is viewed as a 
function of the stakeholder’s degree of control over resources required by the 
organization (Ullmann, 1985). There is some empirical support for stakeholder theory 
(Roberts, 1992, Neu et al 1998; Magness 2006), but these results need extending. In 
the existing literature, stakeholders groups are seen as spatially undifferentiated, for 
example ‘shareholders’, ‘employees’, ‘publics’. A multi-national company is very 
likely to deal with more than one national group of shareholders for example. 
Moreover, in the international context especially, there is no necessary correlation 
between resource control and CSD because societies in possession of crucial 
resources, such as oil, are missing other necessary conditions for CSD to occur, for 
example developed stock markets and structures of political accountability. 
Meanwhile the absence of such structures may increase the perception of political risk 
in countries where investment finance is sourced, thereby creating an asymmetric 
demand for CSD in other locations. In summary therefore the asymmetric response 
hypothesis offers a refinement of stakeholder theory and the possibility of extending it 
for the purposes of empirical testing. 
Although the stakeholder and legitimacy approaches have achieved significant 
results, due to the theoretical overlaps discussed above it is not clear how the 
approaches compare and which of explanation is the more robust. In order to assess 
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this, and the relative importance of stakeholder groups, the approach adopted in this 
study is to quantify the economic, social and political variables. Whilst this allows us 
to see the relative performance of these variables in testable models, a limitation is 
that it does not provide any generalisable test of stakeholder theory or legitimacy 
theory, nor offer comparable results to prior studies which have used qualitative 
approaches, although such results may be complementary to their principle findings. 
The study below is nonetheless important, since it is the first to simultaneously 
quantify economic, political and social variables in this fashion. In selecting the oil 
industry as its principal focus, it provides a useful case study of an environmentally 
sensitive industry operating in highly differentiated international social and political 
contexts. 
 
3. Hypotheses, data and variables 
3.1. Hypotheses 
According to the benign hypothesis, managers feel a sense of social responsibility 
which applies equally to the citizens of the countries in which they conduct their 
activities. As a company expands its scope of operations, the benign hypothesis 
predicts that the scope of the annual report also expands to accommodate the new 
arrangements of social accountability. If the benign hypothesis is true, CSD will be 
positively related to the number of countries of operation. 
 According to the alternative asymmetric response hypothesis, managers apply 
CSD where they are forced to do so by financial, political and social pressures. They 
will make differential disclosures reflecting inequalities in lobbying power between 
countries and between types of institution. For example where political institutions are 
underdeveloped, managers are less likely to adopt CSD in response to pressures in 
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that country. To test the asymmetric response hypothesis three proxies are developed 
to measure financial, political and social accountability, derived respectively from 
stock market data, indices of political risk and social development. 
  
3.2. Data 
The sample comprises 87, 22 and 16 companies from the global Oil and Gas, 
Chemicals and Transportation industries, respectively. Consistent with Alciatore et al 
(2004) oil is the primary focus of the study and the chemical and transportation sub-
samples were chosen as reference group comparators of firms also engaged in 
environmentally sensitive activities, but without the evident political pressures 
associated with oil extraction (Jenkins and Yakovleva, 2006). The dataset is based on 
year 2000 and the sample of oil and gas production companies was obtained from a 
population of 1841 oil and gas production companies (as listed on the Wood 
Mackenzie database). Of these firms, the substantial majority did not have stock 
market quotations and were therefore excluded from the study. Eliminating other 
firms with missing data left a sample of 87. Therefore, most abandoned companies 
happened to be not listed in the stock market or they are only listed once in the best 
situations. Generally speaking, excluded companies were smaller and less multi-
national in scope, which also reduces their potential relevance to the study. The 
information available for the remaining companies allowed the quantification of the 
number of countries where a company has oil and gas reserves and the commercial 
value of these reserves. The sample of 87 oil companies represents 5.54% of the 
population, and covers US$607,982m commercial reserves, or 72.85% of the 
population’s commercial reserves. 
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3.3. Model tested 
The model tested in the paper can be summarised as follows: 
CSD = β0 + β1NOC +β2SMQ + β3CONRISKi + β4ESI + β5FRISK                              
β6SIZE  +  β7 IND + ε 
Where,  
CSD = Corporate Social Disclosure; 
β0 = intercept; 
β1 to β7 = coefficients of slope parameters; 
NOC = the number of countries of operation for each company; 
SMQ = the number of foreign stock market quotations; 
CONRISKi = the unweighted average political risk of the countries in which firm i 
operates expressed as a percentage where 0% = minimum degree of risk and 
100% = maximum risk; 
ESI = the unweighted average environmental sensitivity index (ESI) of the countries 
in which firm i operates expressed as a percentage where 0% = minimum 
degree of sensitivity and 100% = maximum sensitivity; 
FRISK= the total financial risk measured by the standard deviation of stock returns 
for the year 2000; 
SIZE = a control variable that proxies for corporate size and is measured by the 
natural logarithm of sales turnover; 
IND = the industry classification dummy variable, CHEM = chemical industry firm, 
OIL = oil industry firm; TRANS = transport industry is used as a reference 
group; and  
ε = error term. 
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3.4. Dependent variable 
CSD as an empirical variable is defined as all the information produced by corporate 
management in the annual report regarding the interaction between the organisation 
and its physical and social environment, including issues such as those relating to 
human resources, community involvement and the natural environment. This study 
adopts the annual reports as the source of CSD data. The annual report is a statutory, 
accessible corporate document which speaks about the organisation as a whole, is 
widely used in prior research (Deegan and Rankin, 1997 Gray et al., 2001; Wiseman 
1982: 55) and is viewed as credible by user groups (Tilt, 1994).  
Content analysis is used to measure CSD as it has been widely adopted in 
previous social responsibility disclosure studies (Hackston and Milne, 1996). To 
facilitate the completion of the content analysis, an interrogation instrument, checklist, 
and decision rules were developed. The sentence was used as the unit of coding. 
Reliability was assessed using two rounds of pre-testing by three coders. The two pre-
testing rounds produced increasingly convergent views as to what constituted a CSD 
sentence, and led to the formulation of several decision rules and amendments to the 
initial checklist. 
Two measures of CSD were used. CSD is the total number of sentences and 
CSDP is the average number of sentences per page, using an approximation to page 
measurement from the sentence-coded data (after Hackston and Milne, 1996). The 
central assumption underlying the choice of dependent variable is that expanded 
disclosures in the Annual Report are complements rather than substitutes, and CSD is 
the measure that captures this. Therefore, in the regression analysis CSDP is primarily 
a robustness check on the main model. 
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3.5. Independent Variables 
Number of countries (NOC) is used as a measure of the degree of multi-nationality 
(extent of multi-national operations) and the MNC’s power and is the principal 
variable used to test the benign hypothesis, where, if true, a positive relationship with 
CSD is expected. Belkaoui (2001) measures the level of multi-nationality by the ratio 
of foreign profits / total profits and the number of countries in which the company 
operates. Meek et al. (1995) measure multi-nationality as a ratio of sales from outside 
the MNC’s home country to total sales. For this study, because expansion into a new 
country creates a new social responsibility relation and therefore a potentially new 
accountability relation, number of countries of operation is used and was directly 
obtained for each company from its annual report. 
The number of stock market quotations (SMQ) is used to examine whether 
financial market pressure contributes a proportionate increase in CSD. This variable is 
used to test whether or not such listings create financial pressures for more disclosure 
over and above the mere scope of international operations suggested by the benign 
hypothesis. A positive relationship between CSD and SMQ would provide support for 
the asymmetric response hypothesis. The number of stock listings for the sampled 
companies was obtained from Datastream. Listings on more than one stock exchange 
in any given country are counted as one listing for purpose of this study. This is 
because, the stock exchanges in one country usually share the same working 
environment and thus add nothing to the study that aims to investigate the effects of 
foreign multiple listing. Additionally, only those stock listings occurring before April 
2001 are included in the study. Hackston and Milne (1996) provide some evidence 
that dual and multiple overseas listings may be associated with greater social 
disclosure. Cooke (1989, 1992) finds an international listing effect on general 
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voluntary accounting disclosures for Swedish and Japanese companies, respectively 
and Gray et al. (1993) find the same for their sample of U.S., U.K. and Continental 
European MNCs.  
Country risk (CONRISK) is a proxy for political stability. The study uses the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) risk rating system to assign a numerical 
value (risk points) to a predetermined range of risk components, according to a preset 
weighted scale, for each country covered by the system. Each scale is designed to 
award the highest value to the lowest risk and the lowest value to the highest risk. The 
country risk variable refers to different risk aspects of countries where MNCs operate. 
The country risk measure is used twice in the study as a measure of both the 
countries’ of origin and the countries’ of operation political systems (coded 
[CONRISK(O)] and [CONRISK], respectively). For each sample company the 
average political risk for all the countries in which the firm operates was computed. In 
line with the assumption under the benign hypothesis that social responsibility to new 
publics creates complementary lines of accountability, simple averages were used so 
that each country carries an equal weighting. The total was then subtracted from 
100%, so that firms with operations typically in higher risk countries have higher 
CONRISK scores.  
The Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) is used to proxy for social 
development. A high score indicates a high level of development and associated 
social and environmental regulation. The ESI has been used to proxy for country 
environmental risk in other contexts (Sandrea, 2003), but not to date in accounting 
research. The measure includes different areas such as the environmental system 
(urban air quality, water quantity and quality, land, bio-diversity) in the country, 
environmental stresses on the system such as air pollution, water pollution/use, 
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ecosystem stress, waste/consumption, and population, human vulnerability and public 
health, the social and institutional capacity (their science/technical capacity, rigorous 
policy debate, environmental regulation and management, tracking environmental 
conditions, and the public choice failures), and the overall country’s global 
stewardship (its ability to participate in efforts to conserve international 
environmental resources, and its impact on global commons). For each sample 
company the average ESI for all the countries in which the firm operates was 
computed. In similar fashion to the CONRISK variable above, ESI is used twice in 
the study as a measure of both the countries’ of origin and the countries’ of operation 
environmental sensitivity (coded [ESI(O)] and [ESI], respectively). Again, the 
assumption is that under the benign hypothesis social responsibility to new publics 
creates complementary lines of accountability, so again simple averages were used so 
that each country carries an equal weighting. The total was then subtracted from 
100%, so that firms with operations typically in socially underdeveloped countries 
have higher ESI scores.  
Financial risk (FRISK) is included in the study as a risk variable in parallel 
with CONRISK and ESI. It is assumed that if corporate managers engage in CSD in 
response to widening their scope of operations or exposure to political and social risk 
then financial risk will also form part of their risk management strategy. Financial risk 
is computed as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns which was calculated 
from the share prices for the year 2000 and obtained from the Datastream database 
for each of the sample companies. 
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3.6. Control variables 
A number of studies have examined whether industry sector is able to explain 
CSD, so controlling for industry membership in the regressions is potentially 
important. Hackston and Milne (1996) report that disclosures are higher in, what they 
classify as, high profile industries while Ness and Mirza (1991) found this 
relationship holds specifically for the oil industry. On the other hand, Cowen et al. 
(1987), Adams et al. (1995) and Freedman and Jaggi (1986) find that specific areas of 
disclosure are related to industry sector. Cowen et al. (1987) find that the industry 
helps to explain energy and community disclosures whilst Adams et al. (1995) 
conclude that industry sector explains some environmental and some employee 
disclosures. The sample contains companies from three industries, shown under the 
IND grouping variable. They are Chemicals (CHEM), Oil (OIL) and Transport 
(TRAN). Each is chosen for the relative environmental sensitivity of its activities. 
TRAN is used as a reference group so that the differential effects of CHEM and OIL 
can be assessed in the analysis.  
An association between company size and CSD has been demonstrated in a 
number of empirical studies (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Cowen et al., 1987; Kelly, 
1981; Patten, 1991, 1992; Trotman and Bradley, 1981). Although size appears to be 
the most consistently reported as having a significant association with CSD, not all 
CSD studies have supported a size-disclosure relationship, where, for example, 
Roberts (1992) found no relationship in a US sample. Similarly, in New Zealand, Ng 
(1985) failed to support hypothesised association between company size and CSD 
practices. These inconsistencies might reflect differences in the countries of study or 
even the nature of sampled companies (local, multi-national, or a mix of the two 
types). Corporate size is measured in different ways in the prior CSD literature such 
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as by the natural logarithm of book value of total assets (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; 
Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Inchausti, 1997), by the market value of equity (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993), the natural logarithm of turnover (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; 
Patten, 1991; Roberts, 1992). In this study SIZE is the natural logarithm of the 
turnover, being the most popular measure of corporate size in the past research of 
CSD. 
 
4. Analysis 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Summary descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. Preliminary exploration of the 
data revealed a number of problems. As the dependent variable CSD is a count 
measure, the most important issue was model specification. As is typical of such data 
the standard deviation is high relative to the mean. However all companies in the 
sample made some disclosure and there was no limit on the right hand side of the 
distribution. Therefore the dependent variable CSD was transformed into a categorical 
variable CSD1 taking a value of 1 if CSD>0 & CSD<=20; 2 if CSD>20 & 
CSD<=39; … 5 if CSD >80. The effect of this transformation was to reduce the 
standard deviation in relation to the mean (Table 1, Panel A). For the same reasons a 
similar transformation was applied to CSDP, using cut points at CSDP>0, 1, 2, 3, and 
>4 to create a new categorical variable CSDP1. As can be seen from Table 1, the 
effect of these transformations was to reduce the standard deviation relative to the 
mean. To accommodate the categorical dependent variable, ordered probit 
specification was used. 
Table 1 about here 
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 A second problem was the influence of outlying observations in the regression 
residuals in tests of the full model. Royal Dutch Shell had a particularly 
disproportionate influence and was removed from subsequent regressions in which the 
sample size is reported as 124. Cook-Weisberg tests indicated the presence of 
heteroscedasticity in the residuals, so robust standard errors were used in all models 
tested (White, 1980). Finally, as can be seen from Table 1 Panel B there was 
significant cross correlation between several of the independent variables. The 
CONRISK and ESI variables both measure the general level of development to some 
extent and therefore some correlation is to be expected. Multicollinearity was dealt 
with by sequential variable omission and by using stepwise model building. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
4.2. Discussion of results 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the results of six models using CSD1 as the dependent 
variable. NOC was insignificant in all models tested, including model 1a which offers 
a specific test of the benign hypothesis. Although NOC always has a positive 
coefficient, there is no evidence that as the firm diversifies its operations, managers 
feel any obligation to open up new lines of reporting and accountability to the public 
in the affected countries. 
 Model 2a adds the SMQ variable which is highly significant in this and all 
subsequent models tested. Looking at the results in models 1a-6 inclusive it can be 
seen that the SMQ variable dominates the NOC variable. International diversification 
of financial accountability therefore dominates the diversification of operating activity 
as a determinant of CSD. In addition, the marginal effects are much greater. On 
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average, the firms were operating in 18 different countries but had only two stock 
market quotations. Marginal effects analysis shows that an additional stock market 
quotation increases CSD by around 25%.  
 The introduction of CONRISK and ESI variables into the analytical models 
illustrated their differential effects.3 CONRISK had a higher coefficient in all models 
in which it was tested compared to CONRISK(O). In contrast, ESI(O) had a higher 
coefficient and was more significant than ESI in all models. In all models CONRISK 
(including CONRISK(O)) and ESI (including ESI(O)) variables have positive and 
negative signs respectively. As expected, exposure to political risk increases CSD 
whilst relative social underdevelopment reduces it. Model 3a summarises the main 
results from tests using permutations of these variables. 
 Models 4 and 5 show the differential impacts of ESI and ESI(O), confirming 
the latter variable to be more influential. These results suggest that political risk in the 
destination country and social development in the home country condition the level of 
CSD. Because CSD is explained more strongly by the level of social development in 
the multi-nationals’ own country, rather than in the country of operation, the benign 
hypothesis is rejected. Managers do not provide equal accountability to the people of 
the different countries in which they operate. Managers seem to be giving precedence 
to publics that can exert more influence on them and but they feel nonetheless obliged 
to respond to the increased political risk overseas through increased CSD. These 
results provide support for the asymmetric response hypothesis. 
Model 6 reports a stepwise forward selection model using a 0.2 significance 
level for variable addition. The model confirms the positive relationship between CSD 
                                                 
3 On average a sample company’s engagement in international activities increased its 
exposure to political risk by 46% and to environmental sensitivity risk by 43% (based 
on the ratios of CONRISK/CONRISK(O) and ESI/ESI(O) respectively in table 1. 
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and the two CONRISK variables and the negative relationship with the two ESI 
variables. In view of the high correlation between CONRISK and ESI and 
CONRISK(O) and ESI(O) respectively (Table 1), the t-statistics for individual 
variables must be treated cautiously. 
FRISK had a consistently high and negatively significant coefficient. The 
volatility of the firm’s stock therefore seems to act as a strong constraint on CSD. 
There may be two reasons for this. First, where firms have a high level of combined 
operating and financial risk, they may be reluctant to disclose details of other aspects 
of their activities in case the market’s perception of their riskiness increases further. 
Second, the volatility of their stock price may reflect their relatively narrow range of 
international activities which in itself reduces the necessity for disclosure. The 
interpretation of this variable is not central to the main objectives of the current paper, 
but in view of these findings is nonetheless a subject of potential further research.  
Dealing with the control variables in turn, the industry control variables 
showed that whereas oil and transport firms were indistinguishable from one another, 
firms in the chemical industry make significantly more CSD. Finally, the SIZE 
variable was positive and significant in all models tested showing strong support for 
the common finding of a strong relationship between size of firm and CSD. 
Panel B of Table 2 shows the results of similar models using CSDP as the 
dependent variable. Models 1b, 2b and 3b correspond exactly to the same numbered 
models in Panel A. Also, as in Panel A, model 9 reports the results of a stepwise 
forward selection model using a 0.2 significance level for variable addition. The 
results for models 1 and 2 respectively were very similar. Using the alternative 
dependent variable the result for NOC remains the same. In model 3b neither 
CONRISK nor ESI(O) were significant, in contrast to model 3a. In other words, these 
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factors promote an increase in absolute quantity of disclosure (model 3a) but not an 
increase in the prominence of CSD as a reported issue relative to other disclosures 
(model 3b). A possible reason is that because disclosures are being made primarily for 
the consumption of stock market participants and the domestic audience, managers 
consider the quantity of information to be sufficient, and do not privilege CSD at the 
expense of other disclosures. As models 7 and 8 in Panel B suggest, they are more 
likely to do this where CONRISK(O) is high. Again in these models ESI(O) has a 
larger coefficient and is more significant than ESI, suggesting support for the 
asymmetric response hypothesis consistent with the Panel A results. Results for 
control variables are qualitatively similar to Panel A.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper extends prior literature on CSD determinants in two ways. First, it uses a 
sample of multinational firms in environmentally sensitive industries to examine their 
accounting disclosure responses to the pressures implied by the nature and scope of 
their operations. Second, the paper includes two hitherto unexamined variables 
measuring political risk and social development in order that these pressures can be 
measured and their effects directly tested. 
The benign hypothesis, which assumes corporate control by enlightened 
oligarchs of managers, who apply similar standards of social accountability to 
different groups of people across the globe, is rejected. The alternative asymmetric 
response hypothesis is favoured by the evidence presented above. According to this 
hypothesis, the domestic public is comforted by the presence of impressively detailed 
CSDs in annual reports but is in ignorance of the true threat presented by corporate 
activities internationally. Meanwhile in countries where environmental protection is 
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weak, local populations are all too well aware of the impacts of corporate activity but 
lack the defence mechanisms offered by CSD in more developed countries. As the 
survey results show, whatever the conscience of an individual manager, collectively 
managers are motivated by the need to satisfy the requirements of stock market 
participants first, their domestic public second and the people affected by their 
international activities last. To the investor in the developed world, this ‘Maginot’ of 
CSD offers scant protection from the changes in material conditions that necessarily 
follow from the exploitation of the world’s resources by oil companies and others, and 
like the French generals of 1940 they will find that whilst paying attention to their 
neat line of forts, everything else was being lost. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
A: Variable descriptives 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev.        
       
        
          
     
         
         
          
        
      
      
        
       
       
     
         
           
          
           
          
          
           
        
     
     
        
       
         
Min Max Swilk  
CSD 64.544   61.356  
 
1 258 0.000       
CSDP 3.093 2.976 0.040 12.320
 
 0.000   
CSD1 2.838 1.732 1 5 0.033   
CSDP1 2.862 1.579 1 5 0.272  
ESI 50.568 9.937 25.570 77.260 0.808    
ESI_O 35.295 9.370 19.530 62.440 0.000  
CONRISK 28.119 6.022 17.1 45.58 0.083  
CONRISK_O 19.261 6.965 9.500 52.500
 
0.000
  
 
CHEM 0.185 0.390 0 1  
OIL 0.685 0.466 0 1     
SIZE 6.433 1.051 3.580 8.380 0.000    
FRISK 0.120 0.050 0.020 0.300 0.000   
NOC 17.855 22.541
 
2 150 0.000   
SMQ 2.298 1.385
 
1 9 0.000   
      
B: Correlations   
 CSD1 CONRISK CONRIS~O ESI ESI_O CHEM OIL SIZE FRISK NOC
 
SMQ
CSD1 1.000 0.215 -0.103 0.105 -0.068 0.466  
CONRISK 1.000 0.254 0.618 0.147 0.125  
CONRISK_O
 
1.000 0.324 0.627 -0.024  
ESI 0.345 1.000 0.474 0.258  
ESI_O 0.528 0.493 1.000 0.200  
CHEM 0.294 -0.064
 
-0.112 0.185 0.179 1.000  
OIL -0.193
 
0.192
 
0.190 -0.078
 
 -0.224
 
 -0.705 1.000   
SIZE 0.153 -0.210 1.000  
FRISK -0.461 -0.115
 
0.114 -0.047 0.021 -0.081 0.117 -0.371 1.000  
NOC 0.385 0.420 0.123 0.435 0.246 0.225 -0.228 0.578 -0.364 1.000  
SMQ 0.361 0.158 -0.018 0.144 0.009 0.264 -0.185 0.231 -0.259 0.280 1.000
Table 2: 
Regressions on Corporate Social Disclosure 
 
 
A: Dependent variable = CSD1 
 
 Model  
 (1a) (2a) (3a) (4) (5) (6) 
NOC 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004  
SMQ  0.282*** 0.256*** 0.262*** 0.279*** 0.251*** 
CONRISK   0.033**   0.061*** 
CONRISK (O)      0.032** 
ESI     -0.016* -0.033** 
ESI(O)   -0.027** -0.023**  -0.029** 
FRISK -7.620*** -6.955*** -6.679*** -6.643*** -6.992*** -7.846*** 
CHEM 0.934** 0.742** 0.770** 0.812** 0.871** 0.943** 
OIL 0.368 0.278 0.117 0.276 0.364  
SIZE 0.516*** 0.486*** 0.521*** 0.523*** 0.520*** 0.597*** 
       
       
Psuedo R2 0.154 0.179 0.199 0.190 0.185 0.216 
Chi Sq 58.290 83.620 75.420 76.880 81.430 97.350 
N 124 124 124 124 124 124 
 
 
B: Dependent variable = CSDP1 
 
 Model 
 (1b) (2b) (3b) (7) (8) (9) 
NOC 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005  
SMQ  0.279*** 0.268*** 0.254*** 0.278*** 0.262*** 
CONRISK   0.005    
CONRISK_O    0.046*** 0.026** 0.049*** 
ESI     -0.018*  
ESI_O  -0.010 -0.033**  -0.035** 
FRISK -5.543*** -4.681** -4.428** -5.531** -5.653** -5.941*** 
CHEM 0.969*** 0.745** 0.759** 0.884** 0.929** 0.637*** 
OIL 0.493 0.415 0.387 0.302 0.464*  
SIZE 0.501*** 0.476*** 0.491*** 0.537*** 0.524*** 0.548*** 
       
       
Psuedo R2 0.133 0.158 0.161 0.174 0.168 0.171 
Chi Sq 56.010 81.320 79.830 85.910 83.690 79.770 
N 124 124 124 124 124 124 
 
Significance levels  
*** p < .01 
** p < .05 
* p < .10 
 
Based on White’s (1980) heteroscedastic consistent standard errors. 
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